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The Balkan Campaigns of Svyatoslav Igorevich

A. D. STOKES

I

IN a previous article¹ the sources relating to the first Balkan campaign of Svyatoslav Igorevich were studied in an attempt to establish the chronological framework. With this framework in mind, it is now possible to trace the course of events and examine the motives and intentions of those who played a leading part in them.

The story must begin with the ill-advised Bulgarian demand for tribute from Nicephorus Phocas in 965 or early 966. Leo Diaconus's account of the humiliation of the luckless Bulgarian ambassadors² should certainly not be rejected out-of-hand, as it is by some scholars,³ imprudent though it may have been. For where Bulgaria and Russia were concerned, Nicephorus Phocas was obviously inclined to act first and think afterwards. At the time his wars with the Arabs were his main concern, and the whole of his policy towards the two Slav countries was makeshift and ill-conceived, based upon a series of miscalculations which might easily have led to disaster. Runciman has suggested that the tribute demanded by the Bulgarians was in fact the income which Byzantium had agreed to pay, under the peace treaty of 927, during the lifetime of Irene, the granddaughter of Romanus Lecapenus and wife of Tsar Peter—'a dowry paid by instalments';⁴ and this is the best explanation of the whole curious episode. The demand that these payments should continue in spite of the death of the tsaritsa would naturally have incensed the emperor; particularly immediately after his victory at Tars. At such a time, a demand for tribute from any quarter—and the continuation of the dowry payments would now have amounted to the payment of tribute—was not to be tolerated. It was all the more insulting because it came from a country as weak and torn by internal dissension as Bulgaria has been shown to be.⁵ No wonder Nicephorus in his anger called Peter 'a prince clad in skins' and had his envoys beaten.⁶

¹ A. D. Stokes, 'The Background and Chronology of the Balkan Campaigns of Svyatoslav Igorevich' (*The Slavonic and East European Review*, XL, 94, London, 1961, pp. 45-57) (hereinafter referred to as 'Chronology').

² Leo Diaconus, *Historia, Corpus Scriptorum Historiae Byzantinae*, Bonn, 1828, p. 62.

³ P. O. Karyshkovsky, 'K istorii balkanskykh voyn Svyatoslava' (*Vizantiyskiy vremennik* (abbr. *VV*), Moscow, VII, 1953, p. 242).

See also Stokes, 'Chronology', p. 56.

⁴ S. Runciman, *A History of the First Bulgarian Empire*, London, 1930, p. 199.

⁵ Stokes, 'Chronology', pp. 46-50.

⁶ Leo Diaconus, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

Nicephorus's reactions to the Bulgarian demand is not therefore to be seen as part of a carefully prepared plan to settle with Bulgaria once and for all. She was no longer a source of potential danger to the empire. She was disintegrating of her own accord, and there is no reason why the emperor should have considered this particular time an opportune moment for her conquest. But in spite of Bulgaria's weakness, and because the violent expulsion of her ambassadors had been an unpremeditated act, the consequences of which had not been allowed for, Nicephorus thought it prudent thoroughly to intimidate the Bulgarians by a show of force. A full-scale campaign was unnecessary: Peter had only to be reminded of Byzantine power. Accordingly, Nicephorus marched to the frontier with his army, captured a few towns on the Bulgarian side, and justified his action by holding Peter responsible for allowing the Magyars to pass freely through his country on their way to raid Byzantium.⁷ The emperor then returned to his capital, satisfied that the threat of a Byzantine invasion, coupled with Bulgaria's weakness, would be sufficient to keep the Bulgarians in their place.

With this stern reminder that there could be no return to the days of Simeon—although it is unlikely that Peter had any illusions on that score—Bulgaria would have been left in peace until such time as Nicephorus had brought his campaigns against the Arabs to a successful conclusion. But the news from Kherson which greeted the emperor on his return to Constantinople introduced a new factor which was to seal Bulgaria's fate. Much of this part of the story is left untold by the Byzantine sources. From Leo Diaconus and Scylitzes it appears that Calocyrras, the son of the chief magistrate of Kherson, was made a patrician by the emperor and sent to Kiev with 1,500 lbs. of gold, the bribe with which he was to induce Svyatoslav to attack Bulgaria.⁸ It is implied that this was part of the plan conceived by Nicephorus when he realised how costly the invasion of Bulgaria might prove to be; and that Bulgaria was his main concern. This straightforward interpretation of the evidence has been accepted by many scholars;⁹

⁷ Leo Diaconus (*op. cit.*, p. 62) suggests that Nicephorus would have invaded Bulgaria at this time, but that he was deterred by the thought of the disastrous outcome of previous Byzantine invasions of this mountainous area. It would be wrong to attach too much importance to this evidence, which is no more than a rationalisation of the emperor's motives, based on Leo's knowledge of subsequent events. He knew that Nicephorus had turned back without penetrating into the interior of Bulgaria; but he also knew that the Russians had been hired to attack her. He therefore concluded that the emperor had been particularly anxious to disarm Bulgaria, but that he had not done so because he had been deterred by the difficulties of the terrain.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 63; Scylitzes in Georgius Cedrenus, *Compendium Historiarum, Corpus Scriptorum Historiae Byzantinae*, Bonn, 1839, II, p. 372.

⁹ See, for example: Runciman, *op. cit.*, pp. 200–201 (although in an earlier work, *The Emperor Romanus Lecapenus and his Reign*, Cambridge, 1929, p. 98, Runciman's conclusions are different. See below, n.12); B. D. Grekov, *Bor'ba Rusi za sozdaniye svoyego gosudarstva*, Moscow-Leningrad, 1945, p. 64; G. Schlumberger, *Un Empereur Byzantin au Xe Siècle, Nicéphore Phocas*, 2nd ed., Paris, 1923, pp. 451–61.

but the known impotence of Bulgaria suggests that the solution is not quite so simple. If Bulgaria was too weak to offer any resistance to the Magyars who regularly crossed her territory to raid Byzantium,¹⁰ she was also too weak to attack the empire; and there was therefore no need to weaken her still further by instigating a Russian invasion. Nor do the sources explain why it was the Russians who were called in rather than the Pechenegs, the prescribed instruments of Byzantine policy in this area. The advice of Constantine Porphyrogenitus on this subject had been most specific:

To the Bulgarians also the emperor of the Romans will appear more formidable, and can impose on them the need for tranquillity, if he is at peace with the Pechenegs, because the said Pechenegs are neighbours to these Bulgarians also, and when they wish, either for private gain or to do a favour to the emperor of the Romans, they can easily march against Bulgaria, and with their preponderate multitude and their strength overwhelm and defeat them.¹¹

This prescription, written not many years before, fitted the situation in every particular and, if Nicephorus did not follow it, we may be sure that it was not chance that led him to choose the Russians instead. His choice was determined by the Russian victories in the east, which had culminated in the destruction of the Khazar empire and had placed Svyatoslav in a position to threaten Byzantine possessions in the Black Sea area, especially in the Crimea. Thus in hiring Svyatoslav to attack Bulgaria, the emperor was trying to distract his attention from the area in which Russian and Byzantine interests were in conflict.¹²

¹⁰ Stokes, 'Chronology', pp. 51, 56.

¹¹ Constantine Porphirogenitus, *De Administrando Imperio*, ed. G. Moravcsik and R. J. H. Jenkins, Budapest, 1949, pp. 52–3.

¹² F. Uspensky, 'Znacheniiye pokhodov Svyatoslava v Bolgariyu' (*Vestnik drevney istorii*, Moscow, 4, 1939, pp. 92–3); Runciman, *Romanus Lecapenus*, p. 98; N. Znoiko, 'O posol'stve Kalokira v Kiev' (*Zhurnal Ministerstva Narodnogo Prosveshcheniya* (abbr. *ZhMNP*), 8, St Petersburg, 1907, pp. 229–72). In general Znoiko's conclusions are far too hypothetical and imaginative to be accepted, but he is certainly justified in seeing a link between Nicephorus's actions and the Russian victories in the east; see also V. N. Zlatarski, *Istoriya na bŭlgarskata dŭrzava prez srednite vekove*, Sofia, I, 2, (1927), pp. 574–7; M. V. Levchenko, *Ocherki po istorii rusko-vizantiyskikh otnosheniy*, Moscow, 1956, pp. 254–5 (it should be mentioned in passing that the contradiction between the chronology of Ibn-Hauquhal and the chronology of other sources, noted by Levchenko on pp. 253–4, is only apparent. This point was cleared up by V. V. Bartol'd, *Istoriya izucheniya Vostoka v Yevrope i Rossii*, 2nd ed., Leningrad, 1925, p. 167. For this reason Vernadsky's views in *Kievan Russia*, New Haven, 1948, p. 46, which are based on a misinterpretation of Ibn-Hauquhal's date, must be rejected). A. Gilferding, *Istoriya Serbov i Bolgar, Sobraniye Sochineniy*, I, St Petersburg, 1868, pp. 140–1, and Schlumberger, *Nicephore Phocas*, p. 460, consider that the Russians were chosen because they lived at a greater distance from Byzantium than the Magyars and the Pechenegs, and that they were therefore thought less dangerous. Gilferding (*loc. cit.*) adds that the Magyars were exhausted by their wars with Germany, and he dismisses the Pechenegs as an 'undisciplined horde'. But the Magyars were obviously not too exhausted to raid Salonica and the outskirts of Constantinople in 968 (cf. Stokes, 'Chronology', p. 56); and in trying to decide which of the two peoples, the Pechenegs or the Russians, was the less dangerous, Nicephorus would hardly have forgotten that the Russians had already attacked Constantinople three times, while the Pechenegs had never done so.

Zlatarski is undoubtedly right in suggesting that Calocyas had come to Constantinople to report on the dangerous situation developing on the shores of the Black Sea and to ask for help against the Russians.¹³ In this connection Yachya of Antioch's brief account of the Danubian campaigns and their background, though somewhat inaccurate, is nevertheless extremely interesting. He writes that Nicephorus Phocas made peace with the Russians, with whom he says that the emperor had been at war, before obtaining their agreement to invade Bulgaria.¹⁴ Yachya's testimony cannot of course be accepted at its face value, but it may be regarded as a muffled and distorted echo of the clash of Byzantine and Russian interests in the Black Sea area immediately prior to the first Balkan campaign. Another hint at this occurs in the treaty concluded between Svyatoslav and John Tzimiskes in 971, in which the Russian prince undertook not to attack Kherson and other Byzantine towns on the Crimean peninsula.¹⁵

The gravity of the news from Kherson was underlined by the importance of the person chosen to bring it; but the emperor, while fully appreciating the seriousness of the situation, was unable to spare troops for the defence of the city and the war with Russia which would undoubtedly have followed. Diplomacy, which Byzantium used with such skill throughout its history, was the answer. Nicephorus had just returned from putting the Bulgarians in their place; now the Russians were causing trouble. What could be more logical and satisfactory than to play the one off against the other? The Russian thrust was to be deflected and re-directed towards Bulgaria, the only other attractive target in the area which the emperor could offer to the Russians, and where he hoped that they would exhaust themselves. No doubt it seemed a brilliant solution at the time; but it was soon to become apparent that Nicephorus had made a serious blunder. Naturally it never occurred to him that the Russians would succeed in conquering Bulgaria: conquest was not what he suggested to Svyatoslav.¹⁶ But the bribe which he offered was sufficiently large to make a raid in strength an attractive proposition, particularly as Svyatoslav could also count on gaining a large quantity of booty in the event of success; and to

¹³ Zlatarski, *op. cit.*, I, 2, p. 576.

¹⁴ 'And he (Nicephorus)—marched against them (the Bulgarians) and defeated them, and he made peace with the Russians—for they had been at war with him—and he came to an agreement to wage war against the Bulgarians with them and attack them (the Bulgarians).' Quoted in Baron V. R. Rozen, *Imperator Vasilii Bolgaroboytsa*, St Petersburg, 1883, p. 177.

¹⁵ *Povest' vremennykh let*, ed. V. P. Adrianova-Peretts, Moscow, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as *Povest'* in the text and as *PVL* in the footnotes), I, p. 52.

¹⁶ In describing John Tzimiskes's attempt during the second Balkan campaign to persuade Svyatoslav to evacuate Bulgaria, Leo Diaconus shows that the Russians had not been expected to remain in the country, for Tzimiskes is said to have urged Svyatoslav to comply with the agreement by withdrawing his armies (*Ibid.*, p. 103). Scylitzes also affirms that the Russians did not want to return to their own country after the conquest of Bulgaria, in spite of the treaty concluded with Nicephorus (Cedrenus, *op. cit.*, II, p. 383).

Nicephorus, Svyatoslav was merely a barbarian who would not be interested in acquiring territory or power: booty would be the sole object of his campaigns. There was also probably a promise of a further payment from the Greeks when the Russians had carried out their part of the bargain.¹⁷ The total reward may seem over-generous for what was to be no more than a raid; 'enormous', comments Runciman, 'even in those days of wholesale bribery of nations'.¹⁸ But Nicephorus had to make it worth Svyatoslav's while to abandon the idea of attacking the Crimean peninsula, where he could have been sure of an easy victory.

Such were the emperor's proposals and his motives for sending Calocyas to Kiev in the autumn of 966. It is impossible to calculate accurately when Calocyas left the capital and arrived in Kiev, for he may have had to spend the winter in Kherson before proceeding on his way; but he must in any case have met Svyatoslav no later than the early spring of 967.¹⁹ This means that Svyatoslav had at least three to four months in which to assemble his army and march to the Danube, assuming that August, the month given by Scylitzes for the beginning of the invasion, is correct, even though the year is not.²⁰

The next problem to be considered is why Svyatoslav accepted the Byzantine proposals and apparently fell in with the emperor's plans. Was he merely a tool of Byzantine policy in the Danubian campaigns? The tendency of the majority of scholars is either to under-estimate or to over-estimate the political maturity of the Kievan ruler: either he was a hot-headed adventurer,²¹ or else he was a far-seeing statesman with a deep laid and carefully thought-out foreign policy.²² Even a brief glance at the sources should be sufficient to refute the first view. Leo Diaconus makes it plain that the emperor's original scheme did not survive the meeting between Calocyas and Svyatoslav in Kiev. Calocyas had ideas of his own for using the situation to his own advantage. He suggested to Svyatoslav that the Russians should subjugate and retain possession of the whole of Bulgaria, and that Svyatoslav should then help him to win the Byzantine throne.²³ It was this plan which Svyatoslav agreed to, and it cannot therefore be claimed that he first marched on Bulgaria in the role of a Byzantine mercenary, with no independent political ambitions. Nicephorus Phocas realised that Svyatoslav was anything but a simple barbarian adventurer

¹⁷ Levchenko, *op. cit.*, p. 255. See also below, p. 25.

¹⁸ Runciman, *First Bulgarian Empire*, p. 200.

¹⁹ Znoiko, *op. cit.*, pp. 251–2.

²⁰ Cedrenus, *op. cit.*, II, p. 372. See also, Stokes, 'Chronology', pp. 51–2.

²¹ See, for example; N. M. Karamzin, *Istoriya gosudarstva rossiyskogo*, I, St Petersburg, 1818, pp. 173–94; A. D. Chertkov, *Opisaniye voyny velikogo knyazya Svyatoslava Igorevicha protiv Bolgar i Grekov v 967–974 gg.*, Moscow, 1843, *passim*; cf. also Stokes, 'Chronology', p. 45, n. 3.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 45, n. 4.

²³ Leo Diaconus, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

soon after his attack had been launched: hence the abrupt change in his attitude towards Bulgaria and his attempt to win her support.²⁴

On the other hand, many of those who support the opposite point of view either make no attempt to assess the role of the original Byzantine initiative in these events or fail to differentiate between Svyatoslav's first and second campaigns. Thus the impression is created that the Russians invaded Bulgaria in 967 to implement a master-plan for the establishment of a huge empire uniting the southern and eastern Slavs. This over-simplification leads inevitably to a far greater distortion of the known facts. Once such a view has been accepted, it becomes necessary to prove that the part played by Nicephorus in sending Calocyas to Kiev was either of no consequence or furthered a scheme already conceived by the Russian ruler.²⁵ This is what Znoiko attempts to do.²⁶ Even M. N. Tikhomirov, who does not go

²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 78–9.

²⁵ See, for example, M. N. Tikhomirov, 'Istoricheskiye svyazi russkogo naroda s yuzhnyimi slavyanami' (*Slavyanskiy sbornik*, Moscow, 1947, pp. 146–67); *idem*, 'Istoricheskiye svyazi yuzhnykh i vostochnykh slavyan s drevneyshikh vremyon' (*Istoricheskiy zhurnal*, Moscow, 1941, 10–11, pp. 64 ff.). Here (p. 64) Tikhomirov claims that Constantine Porphyrogenitus's (*De Administrando Imperio*, pp. 49–53) statement that the Pechenegs could be used to keep both the Russians and the Bulgarians in order is proof of friendly relations between the two countries. The argument is obviously ridiculous.

²⁶ Znoiko, 'O pokhode Svyatoslava na Vostok' (*ZhMNP*, 18, 1908); *idem*, 'O posol'stve Kalokira'. He argues that the speed with which Svyatoslav achieved his successes in the first campaign, and the extent of these successes, can be explained only if it is assumed that the Russian prince had laid his plans before Calocyas was despatched to Kiev by Nicephorus. He suggests, therefore, that Calocyas had met Svyatoslav previously—either at the end of 965 or at the beginning of 966—and had persuaded him that Russia had more to gain on the Balkan peninsula, where Byzantium was about to annex Bulgaria, than in the Black Sea area. Svyatoslav had recognised the force of this argument and the two had then evolved a scheme which would make the emperor their unwitting accomplice. To achieve this purpose Calocyas set out for Constantinople, where he told Nicephorus that he had managed to avert a Russian attack on Kherson. The point had been underlined by Svyatoslav, who had meanwhile attacked and captured Sarkel, a Byzantine town according to Znoiko. The story was believed, Calocyas was made a patrician for his alleged services, and he then suggested that the Russians should be diverted to Bulgaria. The proposed plan was adopted and Calocyas was duly sent to Kiev with the gold. But he did not in fact bother to go to the Russian capital (this, in Znoiko's opinion, explains why his mission is not mentioned in the Russian chronicles). He simply sent word to Svyatoslav that their scheme had been successful, and that he could now invade Bulgaria without fear of Byzantine intervention. The gold remained in Calocyas's pocket.

Many of Znoiko's premisses are correct: the proposition that Nicephorus was expecting no more than a raid on Bulgaria; that the Russians were selected because of their conquests in the Black Sea area, etc.; but the superstructure of hypothesis and speculation that he builds up on these sound foundations soars far beyond the limits permitted by the evidence. He accepts uncritically Uspensky's unwarranted conclusion that Sarkel was built for Byzantium. (See Znoiko, 'O posol'stve Kalokira', p. 261; *idem*, 'O pokhode Svyatoslava', p. 261; F. Uspensky, *Vizantiyskiye vladeniya na severnom beregu Chernogo morya s IX i X vekakh*, Kiev, 1889 (off-print from *Kievskaya Starina*), pp. 5–12. On Sarkel, see *De Administrando Imperio*, cap. 42; F. F. Vestberg (Westberg), 'Zapiska got'skogo toparkha' (*Vizantiyskiy vremennik*, 15 St Petersburg, 1908, pp. 236–47); see also Germaine da Costa Louillet, 'Y eût-il des invasions russes dans l'Empire Byzantin avant 860?' (*Byzantion*, 15, Brussels, 1940–41, p. 241); A. A. Vasiliev, *The Goths in the Crimea*, *Mediaeval Academy of America*, Publication No. 2, Cambridge, Mass., 1936, pp. 108–9; *PVL*, II, p. 311. Znoiko also attaches far too much importance to fine shades of meaning; for example he thinks it significant that Leo Diaconus called Calocyas's actions 'rebellion' instead of 'treachery' ('O posol'stve Kalokira', p. 236). Equally unconvincing are his attempts to prove that

the whole way with him, allows hypothesis to take command and override the evidence. He considers that Svyatoslav laid claim to the Danube delta, and that Nicephorus was prepared to let him seize the Dobrudja in order to weaken Bulgaria.²⁷ The flaw in this hypothesis is that it implies some bargaining between the two sides. If Svyatoslav imposed conditions before he agreed to attack Bulgaria, and if the emperor accepted them, Russian ambassadors must have been sent to Constantinople to conduct the negotiations after Calocyas's arrival in Kiev and before the invasion in 967. But the sources contain no hint of a return embassy; nor would there have been time for one. Moreover, it has already been shown that Svyatoslav's decision to stay in Bulgaria took Nicephorus by surprise and forced him to patch up his quarrel with Bulgaria. It is therefore clear that he had not agreed beforehand to allow the Russians to retain possession of the Dobrudja.²⁸ These minor inaccuracies are compounded in the *History of Bulgaria* recently published by the Soviet Academy of Sciences. This draws a completely distorted picture of the circumstances in which the Balkan campaigns began, supported by references to Znoiko and Tikhomirov.²⁹

The truth is that Svyatoslav was neither a mere Viking adventurer nor a great statesman with a cunningly conceived grand design from the very beginning of his Balkan campaigns. The Russians invaded Bulgaria in 967 because Nicephorus Phocas invited them to do so, and because the invasion suited both sides. The question whether the attack would still have taken place without a Byzantine initiative is not one which historians can or should answer: all that they know is that the Russians crossed the Danube soon after they had been hired to attack Bulgaria. At the same time, since Calocyas remained with Svyatoslav until the Russian defeat at the end of the second campaign, it can be assumed that his plan had been adopted, and that Svyatoslav inten-

Svyatoslav did not receive the 1,500 lbs. of gold by analysing his replies to John Tzimiskes (*ibid.*, pp. 257–258); while other arguments (*ibid.*, pp. 252–3) are based on the unjustified assumption that Bulgaria was strong enough to attack Byzantium.

²⁷ Tikhomirov, *op. cit.*, pp. 146–7.

²⁸ For the same reason, Vernadsky is not quite accurate when he writes: 'being a shrewd politician he (Svyatoslav) asked for a subsidy to prepare for the Bulgarian campaign and obtained it', *Kievan Russia*, p. 45.

²⁹ *Istoriya Bolgarii*, ed. P. Tretyakov, I, Moscow, 1954, pp. 90–2: 'On the eve of Svyatoslav's campaign along the lower reaches of the Danube, an embassy from the Byzantine emperor Nicephorus Phocas came to him. What exactly the Byzantines asked Svyatoslav remains unknown. The assertion of the Byzantine writer Scylitzes that Calocyas was sent to the Kievan prince to persuade him to attack Bulgaria can hardly be correct. For subsequently it was to Nicephorus Phocas that the Bulgarian tsar turned for protection against the Russian attack. It is scarcely likely that Byzantium wanted to see the Russian troops that had recently crushed the Khazar empire on the Balkan peninsula, in the immediate vicinity of Constantinople. The most likely explanation is that the embassy of Calocyas was sent to Svyatoslav to dissuade him from attacking Kherson where, after Svyatoslav had crushed the Khazars, Russian influence had increased enormously. Having agreed not to attack Byzantine possessions in the Crimea, Svyatoslav demanded by way of compensation that the Byzantine government remain neutral during his campaign along the Danube.'

ded to increase his territory by conquering and annexing at least part of Bulgaria. Even in the first Balkan campaign, therefore, Svyatoslav was to some extent pursuing his own aims, though he was to modify them as the campaign progressed and as he took stock of the political situation in Bulgaria.

II

The Russians reached the mouth of the Danube along the route usually followed by the annual trade caravans from Kiev to Constantinople,³⁰ travelling down the Dnieper and along the Black Sea coast in ships. Their arrival appears to have surprised the Bulgarians who only began to prepare to meet their attack after Svyatoslav had already entered the Danube and was about to make a landing.³¹ A Bulgarian army of 30,000 was hastily put into the field and defeated by the Russians. The survivors took refuge in Dristra.³² The battle itself was evidently fought near Dristra, which would indicate that the Russians had been able to advance a considerable distance up the river before the Bulgarians were ready to oppose them. Peter seems to have put all his available forces into this one desperate effort to repel the invaders, since the sources do not mention any other major battle during Svyatoslav's first campaign. After the battle Svyatoslav went on to capture a large number of towns with apparent ease.³³ The *Povest'* asserts that he took 'eighty towns along the Danube',³⁴ a figure treated with suspicion by some scholars, while Scylitzes merely notes that he razed a great many towns and returned to Russia with much booty.³⁵ No doubt the figure 'eighty' found its way to the Russian chronicle from Procopius's story of the building or re-building by Justinian of eighty forts and fortified outposts along the Danube to hold back the flood of Antae and Sclaveni pouring into the Balkan peninsula from the north.³⁶ A large number of towns in the Danube area was sacked by the Russians, and the chronicler must have assumed that Justinian's eighty forts, of which he had heard, were among them. In any case it would be wrong to suppose, as some have done, that this information shows that Svyatoslav conquered the whole of Bulgaria in the first campaign.³⁷

³⁰ *De Administrando Imperio*, cap. 9.

³¹ Leo Diaconus, *op. cit.*, p. 78; Schlumberger, *op. cit.*, p. 469.

³² Leo Diaconus, *op. cit.*, p. 78; *PVL*, I, p. 47.

³³ Zlatarskii, *op. cit.*, I, 2, p. 580.

³⁴ *PVL*, I, p. 47.

³⁵ Cedrenus, *op. cit.*, II, p. 372.

³⁶ M. S. Drinov, *Yuzhnyye slavyane i Vizantiya v X v.*, Moscow, 1876, pp. 95–6.

³⁷ F. Uspensky ('Znachenije pokhodov Svyatoslava v Bolgariyu', p. 93) thinks that the eighty towns were Russian towns in Moldavia, Wallachia and Serbia, mentioned elsewhere in the Russian chronicles (cf. *Novgorodskaya pervaya letopis' starshego i mladshego izvodov*, ed. A. N. Nasonov, Moscow-Leningrad, 1950, p. 475). Chertkov (*Opisaniye voyny v.k. Svyatoslava*, p. 213), V. V. Mavrodin (*Drevnyaya Rus'*, Moscow, 1946, p. 200), and A. Presnyakov (*Lektsii po russkoy istorii*, I, Moscow, 1938, p. 85) are of the opinion that the Russians captured

Svyatoslav settled down in Pereyaslavets to rule over the territory which he had conquered on the Danube. It is clear that this town was in the extreme north-eastern corner of Bulgaria, but its exact location is uncertain. It has been suggested that it was situated at one of the following three places: near Tulcea, on the right bank of the St George mouth of the Danube, commanding the whole delta³⁸; opposite the swampy island of Balta, on the right bank of the Danube, between Cherna Voda and Khorsovo, near present day Boadzhik and the site of the old city of Capidava;³⁹ at the most southerly point reached by the Danube⁴⁰. The consensus of opinion seems to be that the Tulcea site is the most likely; but there is a great deal of confusion on the subject,⁴¹ and as no positive archaeological evidence of the existence of Pereyaslavets at this site has been found,⁴² it is worth while to consider an alternative location, suggested by the results of recent excavations in Rumania. The site in question was that of the Byzantine fortress of Dinogetia in the north-western corner of Dobrudja, near the village of Garvan and at the point where the Danube turns east towards the Black Sea. Within the more ancient walls a later Slav settlement was discovered. It was founded in the 10th century and, although destroyed by fire in 1070, continued to be inhabited until the 12th century. The town was obviously an important centre of trade, for by 1954, when only three-quarters of the site had been excavated, more than

the whole of Eastern Bulgaria. But in this case it is difficult to see how Philotheus and Nicephorus Eroticus could have been sent to Bulgaria, and presumably to Preslav, in 968 to arrange an alliance between Bulgaria and Byzantium (cf. Stokes, 'Chronology', p. 51). Similarly, there is no reason to doubt that the Bulgarian embassy of June 968 came from the Bulgarian capital.

³⁸ K. Irechek, *Istoriya Bolgar*, Odessa, 1878, p. 240; N. P. Barsov, *Ocherki russkoy istoricheskoy geografii*, Warsaw, 1885, p. 250; Runciman, *First Bulgarian Empire*, p. 202; *Istoriya na Bălgariya*, ed. D. Kosev, I. Sofia, 1954, map, 'Bălgariya ot VII do XII v.'; *Istoriya Bolgarii*, ed. Tretyakov, I, map facing p. 80.

³⁹ Zlatarski, 'Dva izvestni bălgarski nadpisa ot IX vek' (*Sbornik za narodni umotvoreniya i knizhnina*, kn. XV, Sofia, 1898, pp. 136–8); *idem*, *Istoriya*, I, 2, p. 580; N. S. Derzhavin, *Istoriya Bolgarii*, II, Moscow-Leningrad, 1946, p. 14 (but Derzhavin calls the island of Balta a lake).

⁴⁰ B. D. Grekov, *Kievskaya Rus'*, Moscow, 1949, p. 457 (in a footnote Grekov recognises that this is a controversial subject and admits the possibility that Pereyaslavets may have been at the mouth of the Danube); A. L. Pogodin, *Istoriya Bolgarii*, St Petersburg, 1910, p. 44.

⁴¹ Some historians, for example, appear not to have realised that the first two locations suggested above are different places. Tikhomirov (*op. cit.*, pp. 146–7) writes: 'Bulgarian scholars established long ago that Pereyaslavets of the Russian chronicles is Little Preslav, which was located on the swampy island of Balta at the mouth of the Danube.' As authorities, Tikhomirov cites Irechek and Zlatarski. But, as we have seen above, these two scholars do not agree on the location of the town; and the island of Balta is not at the mouth of the Danube, but between Cherna Voda and Khorsovo. Furthermore, Zlatarski says that Pereyaslavets was on the right bank of the river, *opposite* the island, not *on it*. L. Niederle (*Slavyanskije drevnosti*, Moscow, 1956, p. 356) makes the same mistake. He states that Pereyaslavets was near Tulcea which, in its turn, is near Cherna Voda. Levchenko (*op. cit.*, p. 260) quotes Drinov for the location of the town, but actually seems to be following Tikhomirov, since he places it *on* the island of Balta (although the same mistake is not made on the map at the end of the book). Drinov, of course, suggests the mouth of the Danube as the correct site. Finally, V. Nikolayev (*Slavyanobălgarskiyat faktor v khristiyanizatsiyata na Kievskaya Rusiya*, Sofia, 1949, p. 152) argues unconvincingly that Pereyaslavets was really Preslav, the capital of Bulgaria.

⁴² *Ibid.*

160 dwellings had been found.⁴³ Ideally situated on the Danube trade route, close to the mouths of the rivers Seret and Pruth, it carried on a lively commerce with Byzantium, the Orient, the central regions of Russia, 'and the tribes to the north of the Danube, presumably the Tivertsy'.⁴⁴ Among articles which undoubtedly came from Kiev, the most common were pink slate spindle whorls.⁴⁵ Over a hundred were found in the strata covering the period from the last three decades of the 10th century (i.e. from the time of Svyatoslav's campaigns) to the 12th century.⁴⁶ Almost as numerous were glass bracelets of Kievan origin, while faience eggs (*pisanki*) and bronze crescent pendants or lunulae (*lunnitsy*) were not uncommon finds.⁴⁷ Other articles excavated, which were probably of Russian origin, included two mace heads, silver bracelets, a bronze sword hilt, and a gilt bronze tongue from a strap buckle.⁴⁸

Dinogetia, which is some 30 miles from the Tulcea site, fits perfectly Svyatoslav's description of Pereyaslavets as given in the *Povest'*.⁴⁹ It also seems to have derived some benefit from the Russian campaigns in Bulgaria in the second half of the 10th century. The numerous articles of Volga Bulgarian origin found in Dinogetia show that trade sprang up between the two Bulgarias at just about this time, and

⁴³ I. Barnea, 'Elemente de cultură materială veche rusească și orientală în așezarea feudală (secolele X-XIII) dela Dinogetia' (*Studii și referate privind istoria României*, Bucurest, 1954, pp. 195-228); *idem*, 'Byzance, Kiev et l'Orient sur le Bas-Danube du X-e au XII-e Siècle' (*Nouvelles Etudes d'Histoire présentées au X-e Congrès des Sciences Historiques—Rome 1955*, Bucurest, 1955, pp. 169-180). I am very grateful to Mr E. D. Tappe, Lecturer in Rumanian Language and Literature at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, for drawing my attention to these two articles and for translating the first of them for me.

⁴⁴ Stancho Stanchev, 'Slavyanskata arkheologiya v Rumânskata Narodna Respublika' (*Istoricheski pregled*, God. X, Sofia, 1954, 5, pp. 124-6).

⁴⁵ The area in which these spindle whorls were manufactured can be identified without any hesitation. In the whole of Eastern Europe outcrops of the pink slate from which they were made are to be found only in Volhynia. Here the stratum of slate is cut by the rivers Ubort, Uzh and Zherv, and is easily quarried in gulleys along the banks (cf. B. A. Rybakov, *Remeslo Drevney Rusi*, Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1948, pp. 189-90). The slate was worked exclusively in five village settlements on both banks of the river Ubort near the village of Ovruch, and the operation was partly mechanised (*ibid.*, pp. 190-3). The concentration within so small an area of so many village craftsmen all engaged in the same handicraft is unusual and shows that production was geared to a very wide market. Indeed, Rybakov states that there was not a single town site in the whole of Kievan Russia in which these spindle whorls have not been found in large quantities (*loc. cit.*); and it is now obvious that the area of sale must be extended to include north-eastern Bulgaria. The fact that they have also been found recently on territory inhabited by the East Slavonic tribe of Tivertsy (cf. G. B. Fedorov, 'Slavyane Podnestrov'ya', *Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR*, 1952, 2, p. 98), i.e. on the right bank of the Dniester to the Black Sea coast, would seem to indicate that it was along the Dniester that they travelled southwards to Bulgaria.

⁴⁶ Barnea, 'Elemente de cultură materială', p. 197; *idem*, 'Byzance, Kiev et l'Orient', p. 175.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, *idem*, 'Elemente de cultură materială', pp. 198-9, 201-3. On glass bracelets and *pisanki* in Russia, see Rybakov, *Remeslo Drevney Rusi*, pp. 362, 397-8, 459, 467-70.

⁴⁸ Barnea, 'Elemente de cultură materială', pp. 203ff.

⁴⁹ *PVL*, I, p. 48: 'Reche Svyatoslav' k' materi svoyey i k' bolyarom' svoyim': 'Ne lyubo mi yest' v Kiyeye byti, khochyu zhiti v Pereyaslavtsi na Dunai, yako to yest' sereda zemli moyey, yako tu vsya blagaya skhodyatsya: ot Grek' zlato, povoloki, vina i ovoshcheve raznolichnyya, iz' Chekh' zhe, iz Ugor' srebro i komoni, iz Rusi zhe skora i vosk', med' i chelyad'.'

Barnea is of the opinion that it was carried on largely through Russian intermediaries and via Kiev.⁵⁰ As Volga Bulgaria was conquered by Svyatoslav shortly before his invasion of the Balkan peninsula, it is evident that the link was established as a direct result of his activities. There is therefore sufficient circumstantial evidence to warrant the hypothesis that Pereyaslavets and the Slav town on the Dinogetia site were one and the same place. Otherwise it is difficult to understand how two such important centres of international trade could have existed and prospered side by side.

But whether Pereyaslavets was near Tulcea or at Dinogetia, the town would have been well known to the Russians. The East Slavonic Tivertsy, one of the tribes of Kievan Russia, lived just to the north, and it would also have been visited by Russian merchants from more distant areas on their way south to Constantinople and west along the Danube. Strategically it was an ideal centre for Svyatoslav to choose as his headquarters. But obviously it would not have been easy to control the whole of Bulgaria from this north-eastern corner;⁵¹ which suggests that in the first campaign Svyatoslav's conquests were confined to north-eastern Bulgaria. It seems likely that he subjugated Dobrudja and part of Deliorman, sending out raiding parties to sack and plunder towns farther afield.⁵²

In Pereyaslavets, according to the Russian chronicler, Svyatoslav received 'tribute from the Greeks'.⁵³ But as he had already received 1,500 lbs. of gold from the emperor, and there is no mention of a further payment, it is not immediately apparent why Byzantium should have been paying him 'tribute' at this time. Zlatarski considers that the reference to 'the Greeks' is a copyist's error, and that originally the phrase in the chronicle had read: 'taking tribute from the Bulgarians'.⁵⁴ But other explanations are possible without altering the original wording. The exact details of the bargain struck between Russia and Byzantium may not have been known to the Greek chroniclers, and it is therefore possible that the 1,500 lbs. of gold of which they speak in connection with Calocyas's mission was only a first instalment, to be supplemented by a further payment after Svyatoslav had actually invaded Bulgaria.⁵⁵ Alternatively, the 1,500 lbs. of gold may have been paid in two instalments, and not all given

⁵⁰ Barnea, 'Elemente de cultură materială', pp. 213; *idem*, 'Byzance, Kiev, et l'Orient', pp. 177-8.

⁵¹ In the second campaign, after he had seized the whole of Eastern Bulgaria, Svyatoslav did not remain in Pereyaslavets.

⁵² Zlatarski, *Istoriya*, I, 2, p. 580; Runciman, *op. cit.*, p. 202 (Runciman has it that the Russians captured twenty-four towns, but this is presumably a slip—perhaps a mistranslation of quatre-vingt?).

⁵³ *PVL*, I, p. 47: 'yemla dan' na gr'tsekh.'

⁵⁴ Zlatarski, *loc. cit.*

⁵⁵ Runciman, *loc. cit.*; Levchenko, *op. cit.*, pp. 260-1.

to Calocyrras. Equally likely is the possibility that the Russian chronicler, who evidently knew nothing of Calocyrras's mission, had heard vaguely that Svyatoslav had received a large sum of money from the Greeks. Since he thought that Svyatoslav had attacked Bulgaria on his own initiative and knew that he later fought against Byzantium, he would assume that his victories had forced Byzantium to pay him tribute.⁵⁶

The news of the defeat of his army and the knowledge that he could offer no further resistance to the Russians was too much for the ageing Tsar Peter. He had an apoplectic stroke⁵⁷ and retired to a monastery,⁵⁸ where he died on 30 January 969.⁵⁹ As the battle took place in 967 and Peter died in 969, it would seem that Leo Diaconus was not wholly accurate in saying that Peter died soon after the battle. Alternatively, if Leo was right, his evidence might seem to support the view that the invasion had taken place in 968. But the contradiction is only apparent. It can be explained in the light of Ivanov's conclusion that Peter's son, Boris II, ascended the throne some time before his father's death. Through his study of the 'Office of Tsar Peter', Ivanov formed the opinion that, contrary to the generally accepted view, Peter had taken the tonsure not on his death-bed but considerably earlier, and that he had been living as an ordinary monk in a monastery for some time before his death.⁶⁰ In the first edition of *Balgarski Starini* Ivanov states categorically that Boris II came to the throne before 30 January 969;⁶¹ in the second edition, however, probably as a result of Zlatarski's criticism, he is less specific and merely puts his conclusion in the form of a question: if Peter took the tonsure some time before his death, who ruled Bulgaria?⁶²

Zlatarski rejected Ivanov's hypothesis, pointing out that, according to Scylitzes,⁶³ Boris and Roman, Peter's sons returned to Bulgaria from Constantinople only after their father's death.⁶⁴ But this objection is not as serious as it may seem. It is possible to reconcile the evidence of Leo Diaconus, Scylitzes and the 'Office of Tsar Peter'.

⁵⁶ Whatever the explanation, Derzhavin (*Leksii po bălgarska istoriya*, Sofia, n.d., p. 71) is obviously wrong to accept the literal meaning of the chronicler's words. He concludes that they prove that the Russians were in actual fact fighting Byzantium over the heads of the Bulgarians in the first campaign.

⁵⁷ Zlatarski, *op. cit.*, I, 1, pp. 580–1.

⁵⁸ P. Mutafchiyev, *Istoriya na bălgarskaya narod*, 2nd ed., *Sochineniya na Prof. P. Mutafchiyev*, Sofia, 1943, I, p. 272.

⁵⁹ Zlatarski, *op. cit.*, pp. 590–2.

⁶⁰ I. Ivanov, *Bălgarski starini iz Makedoniya*, Sofia, 1908, pp. 82–3; 2nd ed., Sofia, 1931, pp. 383–6. There is, for example, evidence to show that Peter wrote books and a number of *Poucheniya* while he was a monk.

⁶¹ p. 83. Mutafchiyev (*op. cit.*, I, p. 272) also makes the same suggestion but without supporting evidence.

⁶² p. 386.

⁶³ Cedrenus, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 346–7.

⁶⁴ Zlatarski, *op. cit.*, I, 2, pp. 589–92.

Although both Leo and Scylitzes knew that Peter had died not long after the Russian invasion, they do not give the exact date of his death and almost certainly did not know it. They made the mistake of assuming that Boris was released from Constantinople and allowed to return to his own country because his father had died. Such a mistake was easily made because Boris became tsar as soon as he reached Bulgaria. But the real reason for his return was that Peter, who had been weakened by his stroke and old age, no longer felt able to carry the burden of government in face of the Russian invasion. Svyatoslav's easy victories, together with Calocyra's defection, had made Nicephorus Phocas realise that he had made a serious error of judgment. As he was anxious to forestall an alliance between the Bulgarians and Russians,⁶⁵ he would certainly not have allowed an interregnum to continue when it was in his power to put an end to it. Boris was therefore allowed to assume the throne vacated by his father and, in order to ensure that the young man should not throw in his lot with the Russians, Nicephorus Eroticus and Philotheus were despatched to Preslav shortly afterwards to propose a marriage alliance.

The marriage was to be between the daughters of Boris and the young emperors.⁶⁶ As Runciman has already pointed out, they can hardly have been the daughters of Peter and Irene, for the brides must have been very young indeed to have been considered a suitable match for Basil and Constantine, themselves only 12 and 9 years old respectively.⁶⁷ As Peter was by this time about 70⁶⁸ and had been married for nearly forty years at the time of Irene's death, it is unlikely that he had young daughters in 968. If, on the other hand, they were the daughters of Boris, they would have been extremely young; and this would explain why they were not sent to their prospective bridegrooms in Constantinople until 969, i.e. a year after the embassy of Nicephorus Eroticus and Philotheus.⁶⁹ Once it is accepted that they were the daughters of Boris, it must also be accepted that Boris returned to Bulgaria before his father died, as it was to Bulgaria that Nicephorus Phocas sent his ambassadors in 968. Thus the evidence of the two Byzantine sources can be used to confirm the supposition that the Russians attacked Bulgaria in 967. Although both writers refer to Peter's death, they were really speaking about his retirement to a monastery. Peter gave up the struggle soon after the defeat of his army near Dristra. But, as Ivanov has shown, this was a considerable time before his death.

⁶⁵ See Stokes, 'Chronology', p. 51.

⁶⁶ This solution meets the objections of D. Anastasiyevich ('Bolgariya 973-go goda', *Byzantinoslavica*, Prague, 1931, 3, p. 107) to the suggestion that these were not the daughters of Peter. Anastasiyevich insists that they must have been the daughters of the reigning tsar.

⁶⁷ Runciman, *op. cit.*, p. 204.

⁶⁸ Zlatarski, *op. cit.*, I, 2, p. 580.

⁶⁹ See Stokes, 'Chronology', pp. 54-5.

Were the Bulgarians entirely hostile towards the Russian armies which had seized part of their land? From the reasons given by Leo Diaconus for the change in the emperor's policy, it would seem they were not. Nicephorus Phocas decided to come to terms with the Bulgarians because he thought it would be unwise to fight a war against both the Bulgarians and the Russians at the same time.⁷⁰ Moreover, since he took the precaution of stretching a chain across the Bosphorus, it is clear that he feared that the Russian attack on the Balkan peninsula would develop into an attack on Byzantium on the pattern of the earlier raids on Constantinople by Askold and Dir, Oleg and Igor, with the combined armies of the two countries investing the capital from land and sea. The emperor's fears suggest, therefore, that some Bulgarians had already gone over to the Russian camp. But, as he still considered it possible to conclude an alliance with Boris II, it cannot yet have been a mass movement. It should cause no surprise that some of the Bulgarians made common cause with their brother Slavs. Byzantinophobia was widespread in the country long before the Russian armies crossed the Danube;⁷¹ and the knowledge that Byzantium had instigated the Russian attack would have increased the hostility felt towards her.⁷² When Peter withdrew to his monastery and left the country leaderless, it must have been realised by many that the choice lay between Russian and Byzantine domination. Some Bulgarians would undoubtedly have regarded Russian domination as the lesser of the two evils—perhaps in the belief that under the aggressive and energetic Svyatoslav there would be a revival of the stirring era of Simeon when the very name Bulgaria had been enough to make Byzantium tremble. In the Dobrudja, in particular, which was populated largely by Eastern Slavs and had the closest contacts with Kievan Russia,⁷³ co-operation with their kinsmen from north of the Danube would not have seemed too high a price to pay for survival.

This factor not only made Nicephorus alter his plans: it also had its effect on Svyatoslav. He had entered the country as an invader, bent on establishing himself at the mouth of the Danube at the expense of the Bulgarians. But once he discovered Bulgarians who were prepared to accept him as their leader and saw for himself the impotence of Bulgaria's rulers and the widespread hatred of Byzantium, he

⁷⁰ Leo Diaconus, *op. cit.*, p. 86.

⁷¹ See Stokes, 'Chronology', p. 47.

⁷² This is one of the reasons given by Leo Diaconus (*op. cit.*, pp. 137–8) for the Russo-Bulgarian alliance during the second campaign.

⁷³ P. Tretyakov, *Vostochnoslavjanskiye plemena*, 2nd ed., Moscow, 1953, pp. 195–200; *idem*, 'Vostochnoslavjanskiye cherty v bytu naseleniya pridunayskoy Bolgarii' (*Sovetskaya etnografiya*, 1948, 2, pp. 170–83); Rybakov, *Remeslo Drevney Rusi*, p. 79; Zlatarski, *op. cit.*, I, 1, Sofia, 1918, pp. 16, 18; Zh. N. Vyzharova, *O proiskhozhdenii bolgarskikh pakhotnikh orudiy*, Moscow, 1956, pp. 33–8; Tikhomirov, 'Istoricheskiye svyazi yuzhnykh i vostochnykh slavyan v drevneysheye vremya', pp. 63–9.

realised that he could exploit this situation on a more ambitious scale. His enforced return to Kiev⁷⁴ prevented him from putting his new plans into operation immediately, but at the same time it enabled him to make adequate preparations for the more arduous and hazardous task ahead.

In Preslav, the capital of Bulgaria, the new tsar, Boris II, eagerly accepted the proposals for an alliance with Byzantium brought by Nicephorus Eroticus and the bishop of Euchaita. Although he had been a hostage in Constantinople for a number of years, his enforced stay in the world's greatest city cannot have been altogether unpleasant. He was half-Greek by birth; he had been living among his relatives; and his father had always been pro-Byzantine in his policies. The result was that the alliance offered him not only his one hope of expelling the Russians, which was naturally his main concern, but also the prospect of re-establishing the relationship with the empire which had existed for most of his lifetime. The Bulgarian ambassadors who travelled to Constantinople in June 968 therefore carried with them an urgent appeal for military support.⁷⁵ But Nicephorus Phocas was in no position to send troops to Bulgaria, even if he had wanted to. He had problems of his own to deal with both at home and abroad, and he needed all his men for the Syrian campaign on which he was about to embark.⁷⁶ He was, however, able to bring some relief to the harassed Bulgarians by calling on the Pechenegs to attack Kiev, which they did in the summer of 968. This forced Svyatoslav to quit Bulgaria and hurry back to the defence of his capital, and so brought his first Balkan campaign to a close.⁷⁷

III

When Svyatoslav left Bulgaria in 968, it was with the firm intention of returning at the earliest opportunity, and the bulk of his troops

⁷⁴ See below. ⁷⁵ See Stokes, 'Chronology', p. 52. ⁷⁶ Levchenko, *op. cit.*, pp. 259–60.

⁷⁷ *PVL*, I, pp. 47–8. Those who date the first Russian attack 968 naturally think that the Pechenegs besieged Kiev in 969, in spite of the evidence of the *PVL*.

It has been suggested that it was the Bulgarians who inspired the Pecheneg attack on Kiev (cf. Zlatarski, *op. cit.*, I, 2, p. 583; I. Pastukhov, *Bălgarska istoriya*, 2nd ed., Sofia, 1945, I, p. 331; Runciman, *op. cit.*, p. 202). Zlatarski sees proof of collaboration between the Bulgarians and Pechenegs in the fact that it was the Bulgarians according to the *Povest'* (I, p. 52), who warned the Pechenegs in 971 that Svyatoslav was returning to Kiev with a depleted *druzhina* and laden with prisoners and booty. But whatever the relationship between these two peoples in 971, it certainly does not prove that they were allies in 968. Between these two dates the Pechenegs were the allies of Svyatoslav (cf. Cedrenus, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 384, 386). Moreover, if the Bulgarians had managed to get the Pechenegs to agree to divert the Russians, there would have been no need for an urgent appeal for aid to Nicephorus (Leo Diaconus, *op. cit.*, p. 80). It is of course quite impossible to be certain either way, because the *Povest'* is the only source to mention the Pecheneg siege of Kiev, and here it appears as an independent action. But the likelihood is that the emperor was on this occasion following the advice of Constantine Porphyrogenitus (see above, p. 468) in calling on the Pechenegs to check the Russians. The fact that he felt it safe to set off on his Syrian campaign on 22 July 968 (Liudprand, *Relatio de Legatione Constantinopolitana*, *Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Series Latina*, ed. J. P. Migne, Paris, 136 (1853), cap. 34) suggests that by this date he had taken adequate steps to ensure that Svyatoslav would withdraw from Bulgaria.

remained on the Balkan peninsula to hold what had already been won. So much may be inferred from the narrative of the Russian chronicler, who described the return to Kiev in the following words: 'When he heard this [news of the Pecheneg raid], Svyatoslav swiftly mounted his horse and with his *druzhina* came to Kiev . . . And he gathered together troops and drove the Pechenegs into the steppes.'⁷⁸ As his army had reached Bulgaria in ships⁷⁹ and he now returned home on horseback, his fleet must have remained on the Danube together with the majority of his men;⁸⁰ and as he set out for Kiev accompanied only by his *druzhina*, he had to assemble fresh forces before he could relieve it. On this occasion he went overland for two reasons. Firstly, it avoided a journey up the Dnieper against the

⁷⁸ *PVL*, I, p. 48.

⁷⁹ Leo Diaconus, *op. cit.*, p. 78.

⁸⁰ In early Russian literature the words *sest' (vsest') na kon'* were a set phrase which meant 'to take up arms; to set off on a campaign' (cf. *Slovo o polku Igoreve*, ed. V. P. Adrianova-Peretts, Moscow, 1950, p. 382; *PVL*, II, p. 35); and it would often be misleading to translate them literally. It may therefore be thought that the words of the chronicler—'*Svyatoslav' vborze vsede na kone'*'—should not be regarded as an indication that the Russian prince actually did return to Kiev overland. On this occasion, however, a literal translation is permissible, since elsewhere in his narrative of the Danubian campaigns the chronicler makes a careful distinction between the two modes of travelling. For example, at the end of the second campaign, after Svyatoslav had been defeated by John Tzimisce, it is said that he was urged by his *voyevoda*, Sveneld, to return to Kiev by land because the Pechenegs were lying in wait for him at the Dnieper rapids (*PVL*, I, p. 52); but Svyatoslav disregarded this sound advice and travelled by boat up the river ('*I ne poslusha yego i poide v lod'yakh'*', *loc. cit.*)—with disastrous consequences for himself. The Pechenegs prevented him from reaching Kiev and eventually killed him, as they would have done if he had returned by this route in 968. Why did Svyatoslav insist on taking this more dangerous route in 971, when he had chosen to return overland three years previously? Probably because it was the only way in which he could transport his booty back to Kiev; and also because in 971 he would otherwise have had to abandon his fleet for good.

There are also other indications that part of the Russian army was left in Bulgaria. In Kiev Svyatoslav was to say: 'Pereyaslavets is the centre of my land' (see above, n. 49), and this he could not have claimed unless his troops were still in command of the town and of that part of Bulgaria which he had already conquered. Cf. Chertkov, *op. cit.*, pp. 190–1; Levchenko, *op. cit.*, p. 264.

Finally, there is the story found in the now lost chronicles by Tatishchev: 'Setting out from Pereyaslavets in 968, Svyatoslav left there his *voyevoda*, Volk. When the Bulgarians found out about the absence of the prince, they gathered together an army and wanted to take the town. Volk, fearing that the citizens might betray him, and not having sufficient supplies of food, secretly got the boats on the banks of the river and spread the word that he was preparing to defend the town to the last man. He also ordered all the horses to be slaughtered and the meat to be salted. At night he set fire to the town in various places, and when the Bulgarians, thinking to take advantage of the fire, advanced to the walls, the cunning *voyevoda* left in his boats, taking also the boats of the Bulgarians which had been on the other side of the river, and set off down the Danube with all the Russians. The enemy, deprived of their boats, were unable to pursue him. He entered the Dniester and joined forces with Svyatoslav' (V. N. Tatishchev, *Istoriya Rossiyskaya s samykh drevneyshikh vremen*, four vols., Moscow, 1768–84, II, p. 50). The authenticity of this story has been doubted (cf. Karamzin, *Istoriya*, I, p. 179), but in view of the other evidence quoted above it can be accepted as being basically true (Karamzin's objections to it—that the Dniester was not a recognised route from Kiev, and that Pereyaslavets did not actually lie on the Danube—can now be met). There is every likelihood that Volk was a historical figure, since Svyatoslav's son, Vladimir I, had a *voyevoda* called Volchiiy Khvost, who would presumably have been the son of Volk. Cf. *PVL*, I, p. 59, II, p. 362; Tikhomirov, *Slavyanskiy sbornik*, pp. 148–9; Levchenko, *op. cit.*, p. 265.

current and was therefore quicker. Secondly, as the Pechenegs had invested Kiev, they could be expected to be barring the river approaches to the city; and with only his *druzhina* to rely on Svyatoslav would have had little chance of fighting his way through. When he made the mistake of attempting this in 971 he lost his life.

Svyatoslav remained in Kiev for almost a year.⁸¹ At first sight this might seem too long a time for him to have left the army leaderless and inactive in Bulgaria, when communications were slow and rumour could play havoc with morale. But a lengthy absence was unavoidable. At least two months has to be allowed for the mounting of the Pecheneg attack on Kiev from the time the Bulgarian embassy asked Nicephorus Phocas for aid at the end of June 968. Envoys had to be sent from Constantinople to the Pechenegs, who in turn had to make their preparations and cover the distance to the Russian capital.⁸² Consequently the siege of Kiev cannot have begun much before the end of August, and news of it would not have reached the Russians in Bulgaria earlier than about the middle of September. If another four to six weeks are allowed for the journey from the Danube to Kiev and for the mustering of an army, it is plain that the siege of Kiev cannot have been lifted before the end of October at the earliest. This means that Svyatoslav could not have reached Bulgaria before mid-winter even if he had left Kiev almost immediately. In fact he had too much to do in the capital to be able to set out for some time. He now openly proclaimed his intention of settling permanently in Pereyaslavets and making it the centre of a huge empire uniting the southern and eastern Slavs.⁸³ He had therefore to try to ensure that Russia would be adequately governed in his absence and would not be so completely dependent on him that she would again fall an easy victim to any nomad raid which might be launched against her. His mother, Olga, who had ruled the country during his minority and also presumably when he was away fighting in Khazaria and Bulgaria, was now over 70 and had obviously not much longer to live. The result was that Svyatoslav now decided to establish his young sons as his viceroys in different parts of the country: Yaroslav, the eldest, in Kiev; Oleg in the land of

⁸¹ I follow Karyshkovsky's chronology for the second campaign; i.e. Svyatoslav returned to Bulgaria in July or August 969; the war with Byzantium, in which Bardas Sclerus commanded the Byzantine army, took place in the summer of 970; John Tzimiskes invaded Bulgaria in the spring of 971 and peace was concluded at the end of July of the same year; Svyatoslav was killed by the Pechenegs in the early spring of 971. Cf. Karyshkovsky, 'O khronologii russko-vizantiyskoy voyny pri Svyatoslave' (VV, V (1952), pp. 130-6).

⁸² The direct journey from Constantinople to Kiev took two months. Cf. Znoiko, 'O posol'stve Kalokira', pp. 250-51.

⁸³ See above, n. 49.

the Drevlians; and Vladimir in Novgorod under the guardianship of Dobrynia, his uncle.⁸⁴ His next task was to prepare for a new campaign in Bulgaria for which the first requirement was additional troops to reinforce the army already in occupation. This was met partly by the recruitment of Russians and partly by an alliance with the Pechenegs and Magyars.⁸⁵ It is even possible that Svyatoslav drew on the same Pechenegs whom he had just driven away from Kiev. There seems to be a faint echo of such an arrangement in the delightful legend about the siege contained in the *Povest'* which records that Pretich, the Russian *voyevoda*, and the Pecheneg prince exchanged weapons and swore friendship to one another.⁸⁶ The negotiations with the Magyars of Pannonia⁸⁷ on the other hand would have taken considerably longer. In view of all these arrangements and preparations Svyatoslav could hardly have planned to return to Bulgaria before the spring of 969, and by this time his mother was on the point of death and he agreed to wait until the end.⁸⁸ She eventually died on 11 July 969,⁸⁹ and Svyatoslav rejoined his army on the Danube accompanied by his reinforcements in August.⁹⁰

During his absence in Russia the situation in Bulgaria had altered considerably. Western Bulgaria had been the scene of a successful rising against the government of Boris II, led by the Comitopuli, the four sons of a *k'met'* or provincial governor, and was now leading an independent existence.⁹¹ In eastern Bulgaria Boris himself had not been idle. The continued presence of the Russian army in the north-eastern corner of the country in spite of the attack on Kiev was ominous. But Boris made the most of Svyatoslav's absence in Russia by attacking Pereyaslavets and driving the Russians back across the Danube. Thus when Svyatoslav returned to Bulgaria he had to begin the conquest of the country all over again.

The first battle of the new campaign was for Pereyaslavets, and it again decided the outcome of the whole war as far as the Bulgarians were concerned. They put up a stout resistance, and it seemed at one time that victory was within their grasp. But Svyatoslav was able

⁸⁴ *PVL*, I, pp. 49–50.

⁸⁵ Svyatoslav undoubtedly commanded a larger army in the second campaign than in the first. The army that he had left on the Danube had been unable to hold Pereyaslavets (see below), yet once he rejoined it, the Russians went on to conquer the whole of eastern Bulgaria and to threaten Constantinople itself. It is also only in the second campaign that the Magyars and Pechenegs are mentioned as his allies. Cf. Leo Diaconus, *op. cit.*, p. 108; Cedrenus, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 384, 386.

⁸⁶ *PVL*, I, p. 48.

⁸⁷ Cedrenus, *op. cit.*, p. 384.

⁸⁸ *PVL*, I, p. 48.

⁸⁹ *Pamyat' i pokhvala Vladimiru* in E. E. Golubinsky, *Istoriya Russkoy Tserkvi*, I, 1, Moscow, 1901, p. 242.

⁹⁰ Karyshkovsky, 'O khronologii', p. 132; Zlatarski, *op. cit.*, I, 2, p. 595.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 590–641.

to rally his men and recapture his chosen new capital.⁹² This desperate attempt to prevent the Russians from regaining a foothold in Bulgaria seems to have exhausted all the resources which Boris had at his command. At any rate, none of the sources mentions further battles between the Bulgarians and Russians or records how the rest of the country was won. The *Povest'* indicates that immediately after the fall of Pereyaslavets Svyatoslav turned his attention towards Byzantium, sending out his customary warning 'khochyu na vy iti' and announcing his intention of capturing Constantinople.⁹³ Leo Diaconus, after describing the Arab attack on Antioch and the murder of Nicephorus Phocas, speaks of the measures taken by the new emperor, John Tzimiskes, to persuade Svyatoslav, who had already captured Philippopolis, to quit Bulgaria and return home.⁹⁴ Scylitzes also takes up the story again at the point where Svyatoslav, who had subjugated Bulgaria and captured Boris II and his brother, rejected the new emperor's proposals.⁹⁵ But in spite of the gap in the narrative of all three sources it is still possible to piece together what happened in Bulgaria between Pereyaslavets and Philippopolis.

Svyatoslav had already made it abundantly clear to his mother

⁹² *PVL*, I, p. 50: 'Pride Svyatoslav' v Pereyaslavets', i zatvorishasya bolgare v' grade I izlezosha bolgare na sechyu protivu Svyatoslavu, i byst' secha velika, i odolyakhu bol'gare. I reche Svyatoslav' voyem' svoym': "Uzhe nam' sde pasti; potyagnem muzh'ski, brat'ya i druzhino!" I k' vecheru odole Svyatoslav', i vsya grad' kop'yem'.

Zlatarski (*op. cit.*, I, 2, p. 598) and Runciman (*op. cit.*, p. 205) contend that the battle was for the Bulgarian capital, Preslav, and not for Pereyaslavets, or Little Preslav. But it has already been shown that there is every reason to believe that the Russians were forced to abandon Pereyaslavets while Svyatoslav was in Kiev; and consequently he would have had to recapture the town which he had designated as his future capital on his return. Zlatarski thinks it significant that *PVL* calls the town for which the battle was fought 'Pereyaslavets' and not 'Pereyaslavets-on-the Danube'; but on the three other occasions when it is mentioned by the chronicler in connection with the first campaign (when there can be no doubt that the chronicler is referring to Little Preslav) it is called: a) Pereyaslavets-on-the-Danube (*PVL*, I, p. 48: 'Khochyu zhiiti v Pereyaslavtsi na Dunai'); b) simply Pereyaslavets (*ibid.*, p. 47: 'Pridosha na Rusku zemlyu pervoye, a Svyatoslav' byashe Pereyaslavtsi'); and c) once again Pereyaslavets, but there is an indication that the town lay on the Danube (*ibid.*: 'Svyatoslav' . . . vzya gorod' 80 po Dunayevi, i sede knyazha tu v' Pereyaslavtsi'). This surely demonstrates that the words 'on-the-Danube' were not part of the name of the town. In the first example Svyatoslav is making it clear to those in Kiev where exactly his new capital is to be (and, incidentally, the wording in the *First Novgorod Chronicle* is somewhat different: 'v' Pereyaslavtsi i v Dunai', *Novgorodskaya pervaya letopis'*, p. 120); and in the third example it was the chronicler who was mentioning the town for the first time, and therefore he too had to make its geographical position clear.

Zlatarski also makes the point that the word *grad* is applied here both to Pereyaslavets and to Constantinople, which seems to him an indication that in both cases the chronicler was referring to a capital city. But what other word could have been used to describe Little Preslav? *Grad* signified any fortified settlement—from Constantinople to a cluster of huts surrounded by an earthwork and a stockade.

Finally, there is other evidence to show that the Russians occupied the Bulgarian capital without a struggle. See below.

⁹³ *PVL*, I, p. 50.

⁹⁴ Leo Diaconus, *op. cit.*, p. 105.

⁹⁵ Cedrenus, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 383–4.

and the Kievan boyars that he intended to stay in Bulgaria permanently.⁹⁶ His replies to John Tzimiskes after Philippopolis made it no less clear to the Greeks.⁹⁷ This was a critical time for Tzimiskes. On 11 December 969 he had succeeded in engineering the murder of the Emperor Nicephorus with the help of Theophano, the emperor's wife and his own mistress.⁹⁸ This had given him the throne; but he had still to win support and consolidate his position. At home the Church was hostile and had to be placated by concessions;⁹⁹ the people had also suffered three years of famine and were restive.¹⁰⁰ The prospects abroad were no better. Antioch was again threatened by the Arabs, while the drive southwards of the Russian armies in Bulgaria showed no signs of slackening. As Svyatoslav's ambitions constituted the most immediate threat, the emperor decided to try to avert it by diplomacy and sent ambassadors to Svyatoslav, reminding him that he had been hired only to raid Bulgaria, offering to pay what Nicephorus Phocas had promised him, and suggesting that he should now honour his agreement with Nicephorus and evacuate Bulgaria.¹⁰¹ But Svyatoslav was determined not only to keep Bulgaria but to extend his conquests even further. In his reply to John Tzimiskes he therefore placed an impossibly high price on his withdrawal from the Balkan peninsula and told the emperor that there was no hope of peace unless the 'Romans' evacuated Europe.¹⁰² Tzimiskes made one further attempt to avoid war, probably with the aim of gaining time to prepare his army rather than with any real hope of success. He now changed his tone and reminded Svyatoslav of the fate of Igor,¹⁰³ his father, whose attack on Constantinople in 941 had ended in a crushing defeat after his fleet had been destroyed by 'Greek fire'.¹⁰⁴ But Svyatoslav had too much confidence in himself to be deterred by anything short of his own defeat on the field of battle, an experience which he had never yet met with in his short but adventurous life. He replied contemptuously that the emperor could spare himself the trouble of coming out to meet him, as he would soon be pitching his own tents beneath the walls of Constantinople.¹⁰⁵

An examination of Russo-Bulgarian relations during the second Russian campaign indicates how Svyatoslav intended to further his

⁹⁶ See above, n. 49.

⁹⁷ Cedrenus, *loc. cit.*

⁹⁸ Leo Diaconus, *op. cit.*, pp. 84 ff.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 102; Levchenko, *op. cit.*, p. 273.

¹⁰⁰ Liudprand, *op. cit.*, pp. 922, 927.

¹⁰¹ Leo Diaconus, *op. cit.*, p. 103.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, p. 105.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 106.

¹⁰⁴ *PVL*, I, p. 33.

¹⁰⁵ Leo Diaconus, *op. cit.*, pp. 106–7.

designs on Byzantium.¹⁰⁶ The long and detailed narratives of Leo Diaconus and Scylitzes which describe the savage battles between Greeks and Russians make clear that the Russians now had Bulgarians as their allies. Bulgarians fought at Arcadiopolis¹⁰⁷ and took part in the heroic defence of the inner citadel at Preslav when they preferred death to surrender.¹⁰⁸ After Tzimisce had captured the Bulgarian capital and was continuing his drive northwards to Dristra for the decisive battle with Svyatoslav and the main Russian army, Leo and Scylitzes both refer to the many Bulgarians who deserted the Russian camp and transferred their allegiance to Byzantium.¹⁰⁹ This was why Svyatoslav executed 300 Bulgarians in Dristra.¹¹⁰ The testimony of Asogikh, the Armenian chronicler, points in the same direction. He calls the war a war between Bulgaria and Byzantium, in which the Russians were allies of the Bulgarians.¹¹¹ The position of Boris II during the Russian occupation is particularly revealing. When he was captured by Byzantine troops in Preslav in 971, he was not a prisoner of the Russians. On the contrary, while the Russians and Bulgarians were making their last stand in the inner citadel, he was discovered wandering freely in the outer city with his family.¹¹² What is more significant still is that he should ever have been allowed to remain in his capital and wear his regal robes when Svyatoslav was 80 kilometres away in Dristra.¹¹³ All this makes it plain that the Russians and Bulgarians had concluded a formal alliance under which Boris was allowed to continue to rule as tsar in Bulgaria, though as a figurehead.

The alliance must have been made soon after the Bulgarian defeat

¹⁰⁶ For Bulgaro-Russian relations during the second campaign, see Mutafchiyev, 'Russko-bolgarskiye otnosheniya pri Svyatoslave' (*Seminarium Kondakovianum*, IV, Prague, 1931, pp. 77–92); Karyshkovsky, 'Russko-bolgarskiye otnosheniya vo vremya Balkanskikh voyn Svyatoslava' (*Voprosy istorii*, Moscow, 1951, 8, pp. 101–5); *idem*, 'K istorii balkanskikh voyn Svyatoslava', pp. 224–43. The first of Karyshkovsky's two articles is largely a repetition of Mutafchiyev, although he criticises him for not abandoning 'idealistic, anti-scientific conceptions', and calls his attempt to throw new light on the campaigns unsuccessful. Another Soviet scholar, M. V. Levchenko (*op. cit.*, pp. 261 ff.) quotes Mutafchiyev's work with approval.

¹⁰⁷ Leo Diaconus, *op. cit.*, p. 108; Cedrenus, *op. cit.*, II, p. 384. On p. 386 Scylitzes records that the army was divided into three sections, with the Bulgarians and Russians in the first, the Magyars in the second, and the Pechenegs in the third. It has been rightly pointed out that this confirms that the Russians here were Slavs and not Varangians, for the army had obviously been divided on linguistic lines, with the Bulgarians and Russians together because of their common language. When speaking of the enemy as a whole, Scylitzes even calls them Bulgarians instead of Russians.

¹⁰⁸ Leo Diaconus, *op. cit.*, pp. 137–8.

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 138–9; Cedrenus, *op. cit.*, II, p. 401. Leo speaks specifically of an alliance between the two peoples.

¹¹⁰ Leo Diaconus, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

¹¹¹ *Histoire Universelle par Étienne Asotik de Taron*, translated by F. Macler, Paris, 1917, pp. 44–5: 'Après quoi [John Tzimisce] se rendit en personne dans le pays des Bulgares, pour leur faire la guerre, ces peuples, soutenus par la nation des Russes, avec laquelle ils s'étaient alliés, s'avancèrent pour le repousser.'

¹¹² Leo Diaconus, *op. cit.*, p. 136; Cedrenus, *op. cit.*, II, p. 396.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*

at Pereyaslavets when Boris II recognised that further resistance was out of the question. His previous appeal to Byzantium in 968 had resulted in the Pecheneg attack on Kiev; but this had proved to be only a temporary solution, and even the Pechenegs were now Svyatoslav's allies. In these circumstances Boris had no alternative but to accede to any demands which his Russian conqueror might make on him. Svyatoslav's terms were in reality much more favourable than Boris could reasonably have expected. This was because Svyatoslav had returned to Bulgaria with the firm intention of taking advantage of the readiness to accept Russian leadership which had become apparent during the previous campaign. He now wanted Bulgaria for himself, and it was not in his interests to plunder and lay it waste if he could achieve his objective by diplomacy. The Bulgarians were obliged to accept Russian domination; but Svyatoslav sweetened the pill by turning the campaign into a war against Byzantium and thus took advantage of the hatred of the empire which was so widespread in Bulgaria.¹¹⁴ The alliance may also have included a promise of joint action against the rebels in Western Bulgaria, since it is difficult to imagine that Svyatoslav would not eventually have wanted to deal with them.¹¹⁵ But the first essential was to win the war with Byzantium in order to ensure that the emperor would not intervene while the Russian armies were engaged elsewhere. Svyatoslav was willing to let Boris II remain nominal tsar of Bulgaria. He himself had no need for additional titles; and the descriptions of him do not suggest that he was a man to set much store by the mere trappings of power.¹¹⁶ From now on he intended Bulgaria to occupy a place in his new empire of southern and eastern Slavs similar to that assigned to Russia. He had already given his sons control over the internal administration of Russia and was ready to allow Boris similar authority in Bulgaria, while he himself remained established half-way between Russia and Bulgaria in Pereyaslavets or perhaps Dristra. Later, if he achieved his ultimate aim of conquering Byzantium, the title of tsar of Bulgaria would have less significance than ever.

V. Nikolayev has recently suggested that Svyatoslav's amicable relations with Boris II and all the other evidence of a Russo-Bulgarian alliance in the second campaign can only be explained on the assumption that Svyatoslav's mother was a Bulgarian by birth and that Svyatoslav and Boris were therefore linked by family ties.¹¹⁷ He adduces a certain amount of evidence for this hypothesis.¹¹⁸ He

¹¹⁴ See Stokes, 'Chronology', p. 47.

¹¹⁵ Western Bulgaria was not occupied by the Russians. See Zlatarski, *op. cit.*, I, 2, pp. 625-6.

¹¹⁶ See Stokes, 'Chronology', p. 44.

¹¹⁷ V. Nikolayev, *op. cit.*, p. 102.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 98-104.

first analyses the 'life' of Olga included in the *Stepennaya Kniga*, which says that she was a Varangian of non-noble birth, and that she founded the city of Pskov.¹¹⁹ He points out that the name of the city, which the chronicles sometimes give as Pleskov,¹²⁰ is very similar to the name of Bulgaria's first capital, Pliska. This leads him to conclude that Olga could not have been a Varangian, since a Varangian would not have founded a city with an incomprehensible Bulgarian name. He next points to the Laurentian redaction of the *Povest'* where Olga is said to have been a Christian and to have come from Pskov (he omits to mention that the chronicler also says that she became a Christian in 955, only fourteen years before her death).¹²¹ He argues that as Pskov did not exist in the 9th and early 10th centuries, when Olga was a child, the chronicler must therefore have meant Pliska, the first Bulgarian capital. He also sees some support for his view in Olga's efforts to dissuade her son from attacking Bulgaria¹²² and in Svyatoslav's description of Pereyaslavets as the centre of his lands.¹²³

But even to the casual eye Nikolayev's thesis lacks substance. It would certainly be logical to conclude that if Olga had been a Varangian she would have been unlikely to found a town with a Bulgarian name. But when Nikolayev goes on to maintain that she could not have founded Pskov, because it did not exist in the 9th and early 10th centuries, he destroys his own argument. The age of Pskov has been established by archaeologists. The earliest settlement on the site of the town dates from the 2nd or 3rd centuries A.D.; and by the middle of the first millennium A.D. it was already a tribal centre. From the 8th century it can be called a town; by the 9th it had a wooden road; and in the 10th century a stone wall was built round the Pskov Kremlin.¹²⁴ Thus, Olga could not have founded Pskov; she could have been a Varangian; and she could have been born in the town. If she had been born in Bulgaria, and particularly

¹¹⁹ *Kniga Stepennaya Tsarskogo Rodoslaviya, Polnoye sobraniye russkikh letopisey*, XXI, 1, St Petersburg, 1908, p. 6.

¹²⁰ Cf., for example, *Novgorodskaya pervaya letopis'*, pp. 23, 25; *PVL*, I, pp. 43, 102.

¹²¹ *PVL*, I, p. 23.

¹²² In reality, Olga merely tried to persuade Svyatoslav to remain in Kiev. Cf. *PVL*, I, p. 48: 'Reche yemu Volga: "Vidishi mya bolnu sushchyu; kamo khoshcheshi ot' mene iti? ... Pogreb' mya idi, yamo zhe khocheshi"'.

¹²³ See above, n. 49. Nikolayev also asserts that the names of Malusha, Svyatoslav's concubine and Vladimir I's mother, and of Mal, her father, are Bulgarian; and that Dobrynia, Vladimir I's uncle and Malyusha's brother, tried to dissuade Vladimir from making war on the Bulgarians in 985, presumably because he too was a Bulgarian. But Vladimir's campaign of 985 (cf. *PVL*, I, p. 59) was directed against the Volga, not the Danubian, Bulgarians. Cf. B. D. Grekov, 'Volzhskiy bolgary v IX-X vv'. (*Istoricheskiye zapiski*, 14, Moscow, 1945, pp. 13-14).

¹²⁴ S. A. Tarakanova, 'O proiskhozhdenii i vremeni vozniknoveniya Pskova' (*Kratkiye soobshcheniya o dokladakh i polevykh issledovaniyakh Instituta Istorii Materyal'noy Kul'tury Akademii Nauk SSSR*, XXX, Moscow, 1950, pp. 18-29); M. N. Tikhomirov, *Drevnerusskiye goroda*, 2nd ed., Moscow, 1956, pp. 27-8, 388-91.

if she was related to the Bulgarian royal family and had been born in the first Bulgarian capital, she would already have been a Christian at the time of her marriage to Igor. But a Christian would not have married the pagan Igor and would certainly not have gone to Constantinople to be baptised at the age of sixty or over, as Olga is known to have done from the *Povest'*.¹²⁵ There is therefore no reason to believe that Olga was a Bulgarian. Her Scandinavian name¹²⁶ suggests that she was born of Varangian parents, while the tradition that she came from Pskov and the Slavonic name of her son suggest that she lived all her life in Russia.

In any case, it is unnecessary to look beyond mutual need and mutual advantage for an explanation of the Russo-Bulgarian alliance. Boris had little to lose in agreeing to it. The Russian occupation was at least a guarantee against outside attacks, and it left him with a far greater measure of freedom than he was to enjoy after the 'liberation' of Bulgaria by John Tzimiskes. A weak man like his father, he wanted a quiet and peaceful life, and the knowledge that he had no option but to fall in with Svyatoslav's ambitious plans, which incidentally lifted many of the burdens of responsibility from his own shoulders, must almost have been a relief to him. The reaction of the Bulgarian people to the alliance seems in the main to have been favourable. It is true that there were instances of opposition¹²⁷ and that some Bulgarians hastened to abandon the Russians when the fortunes of war turned against them. But much of the evidence confirms that they joined Svyatoslav as willing allies, not as forced conscripts.¹²⁸ Scylitzes states that they united with the Russians 'for the common cause',¹²⁹ while Leo explains that they did so because they blamed the Byzantines for the Russian attack.¹³⁰

Svyatoslav restrained his men as much as possible and did all that he could to avoid rousing the hostility of the population. Bulgaria's

¹²⁵ *PVL*, I, pp. 44-5.

¹²⁶ Tikhomirov (*Slavyanskiy sbornik*, p. 139), who also puts forward the tentative suggestion that Olga came from Pliska in Bulgaria, considers that Olga's name was Slavonic not Scandinavian, and points out that in the north of Russia she was called *Allogiya*, while in the Madrid manuscript of Scylitzes her name is given as *Ulgā*. But as Constantine Porphyrogenitus, who actually met and spoke to her, calls her *Helga* (cf. Constantine Porphyrogenitus, *De Cerimoniis Aulae Byzantinae, Corpus Scriptorum Historiae Byzantinae*, Bonn, 1830, II, p. 594), it is more likely that the latter is the correct form of her name—i.e. that it was Scandinavian.

¹²⁷ See below.

¹²⁸ In A. A. Shakhmatov's opinion (*Razyskaniya o drevneyshikh russkikh letopisnykh svodakh*, St Petersburg, 1908, pp. 130-1), the attitude of the Bulgarians towards Svyatoslav is reflected in the account of the campaign in the *Povest'*. Shakhmatov argues that the detailed knowledge of the campaign revealed by the chronicler indicates that he was using as a source a lost Bulgarian chronicle. In the latter, Svyatoslav was portrayed as a legendary hero to compensate for the humiliation suffered by the Bulgarians as a result of their defeat by the Russians. They comforted themselves with the thought that he had also made mighty Byzantium tremble.

¹²⁹ Cedrenus, *op. cit.*, II, p. 384.

¹³⁰ Leo Diaconus, *op. cit.*, p. 137.

royal treasures and churches were plundered by John Tzimisce and his men,¹³¹ whose loot testifies to the good behaviour of the Russians¹³² Svyatoslav's policy was dictated by commonsense and was based upon the experiences of the first campaign. Bulgaria was to be won by diplomacy not by brute force; and Svyatoslav had this in mind when he boasted that Russian arms had subjugated whole countries without bloodshed.¹³³ It was naturally an exaggeration to claim that the whole of Bulgaria had fallen to him without a struggle. Blood was shed on more than one occasion during the second campaign, and Svyatoslav resorted to cruelty and violence without the slightest compunction when faced with opposition. It is unnecessary to minimise this aspect of the campaign, as Karyshkovsky seeks to do.¹³⁴ To think that Svyatoslav abjured force in Bulgaria out of love for his brother Slavs, or because he was naturally opposed to violence, is naive. All that is known about his character argues to the contrary; and if in general he did not resort to force in Bulgaria, it was because he was intelligent enough to realise that he would gain more by the skilful exploitation of the political turmoil in the country. But when peaceful tactics failed, he never hesitated to bludgeon the resistance into submission. At Philippopolis, which was unwilling to accept Russian domination, 20,000 of the inhabitants were impaled;¹³⁵ and it may be asked why the town opposed the alliance with Svyatoslav when it had been accepted throughout the rest of eastern Bulgaria? It may well be that this resistance in Philippopolis was directed not so much against Svyatoslav himself as against the central authority for which he stood. The town was the birth-place of Bogomilism,¹³⁶ and it is likely that the local population had followed the example of western Bulgaria and taken advantage of the Russian invasion to declare their independence. If so, they would naturally oppose the Russians who were supporting the government of Boris. Svyatoslav also took off the velvet glove in the final stages of the war after Tzimisce had captured Preslav and the Bulgarians were beginning to change sides. On this occasion he had 300 boyars beheaded in Dristra and 20,000 Bulgarians imprisoned in chains.¹³⁷ But these

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 136, 148, 158; Cedrenus, *op. cit.*, II, p. 413.

¹³² There is nothing in the sources to support Schlumberger's view that Svyatoslav had made an agreement with the Bulgarian aristocracy, promising them a return to paganism and the restoration of their former privileges (cf. *L'Épopée Byzantine à la Fin du X^e Siècle*, Jean Tzimisce, I, Paris, 1896, p. 48). If there had been such an agreement, Boris II would have been its first victim; and the fact that the Russians spared the churches shows that there was no persecution of Christians as such.

¹³³ Leo Diaconus, *op. cit.*, p. 151.

¹³⁴ Karyshkovsky, 'Russko-bolgarskiye otnosheniya', pp. 103-4. See also Tikhomirov, *Slavyanskiy sbornik*, pp. 149-50, who implies that the evidence of a Russo-Bulgarian alliance automatically invalidates the stories of Russian atrocities during the second campaign.

¹³⁵ Leo Diaconus, *op. cit.*, p. 105.

¹³⁶ See Stokes, 'Chronology', p. 48.

¹³⁷ Leo Diaconus, *op. cit.*, p. 139; Cedrenus, *op. cit.*, II, p. 400.

examples of his ruthlessness when he was opposed—and allowance should be made for exaggeration—only serve to corroborate the view that the greater part of eastern Bulgaria offered no resistance. They prove in particular that there was no battle for Preslav: if the capital had fallen only after a bitter struggle, its treasures would surely not have been spared.

The detailed story of the battles between Russians and Byzantines, which led to victory for John Tzimiskes and to Svyatolav's expulsion from Bulgaria, needs no retelling.¹³⁸ But there are still several puzzling points about the war which neither Russian nor Byzantine sources help to explain. One is why the mountain passes into Bulgaria had been left unguarded. Another is why Svyatoslav was at the other end of Bulgaria in Dristra on the Danube when the emperor invaded the country in the spring of 971. Runciman's view is that the Bulgarian population had been restive and the Russians had not enough spare troops to defend the passes, and that Svyatoslav was in Dristra 'trying to keep open communications in the teeth of the Imperial fleet'.¹³⁹ But his arguments are not entirely convincing. They imply that Svyatoslav was prepared to give up the struggle and look for a way of escape even before Tzimiskes had crossed the Balkans or the Russians had fought a single battle with the Byzantines on Bulgarian soil; which can hardly be reconciled with what is known of Svyatoslav's character and with the stubborn defence of Preslav and Dristra later in the war. It may also be asked why Svyatoslav had left a garrison in Preslav if he was thinking of withdrawal, and why it should have been Dristra from which he was trying to keep communications open when it lay at least a hundred miles from the Russian frontier? A much better choice would have been Pereyaslavets, which commanded the Danube delta and was separated from the territory of the Russian Tivertsy only by the river's breadth. Nor does anything indicate that the Bulgarian population was rebellious. It was only when Preslav fell that they began to desert the Russians; and in Preslav itself many of them resisted the Greeks to the death. If the Bulgarian population was already beginning to turn against him, it is also unlikely that Svyatoslav would have allowed their tsar to remain in the capital while he himself was in Dristra, especially if he had known, as Runciman's hypothesis implies, that a Byzantine invasion was imminent. But irrespective of the attitude of the Bulgarians, may not Svyatoslav still have had too few troops to spare for the defence of the passes? To answer this question it is necessary to consider his losses during the second campaign before Tzimiskes

¹³⁸ For a detailed account of the war, see Schlumberger, *L'Épopée Byzantine*, I, chapters I–III; Runciman, *op. cit.*, pp. 206–14.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 208–9.

penetrated into Bulgaria. He had fought only two major battles in the whole of this period. The first, which was at Pereyaslavets at the start of the campaign, had obviously not weakened the Russians to any appreciable extent. The second, which was at Arcadiopolis in the summer of 970, had seen the first full-scale clash with the Byzantine army. It is this battle at Arcadiopolis which presents a further difficulty.

In Byzantine sources Arcadiopolis is described as an overwhelming victory for Bardas Sclerus, the Byzantine commander.¹⁴⁰ The *Povest'*, on the other hand, mentions only one battle with the Byzantines and shows the Russians to have been the victors.¹⁴¹ Though some scholars accept the *Povest'* version,¹⁴² the majority regard the battle as a Russian defeat.¹⁴³ This majority view should undoubtedly be accepted. But the question remains whether the defeat was as decisive as the Byzantine sources suggest;¹⁴⁴ and many convincing arguments have been advanced to show that it was not.

Drinov, who regarded Arcadiopolis as a Russian victory, based his case not so much on the evidence of the *Povest'* as on the renewed Russian attacks on Thrace (or Macedonia as the region in question was then called)¹⁴⁵ after Arcadiopolis and before the emperor's invasion of Bulgaria. This continued Russian activity convinced him that the Russian losses at Arcadiopolis could not have been as heavy as the Byzantine historians made them out to be. Schlumberger however dismissed Drinov's conclusions and argues that the Russians reappeared in Thrace only the year following Arcadiopolis and only because Bardas Sclerus had been sent to Asia to put down the rebellion of Bardas Phocas.¹⁴⁶ But as the battle of Arcadiopolis and the later Russian attacks on Thrace both took place in 970,¹⁴⁷ Schlumberger's own case falls down on the chronology. It is thus clear that while the Russians undoubtedly suffered a set-back at Arcadiopolis, it was not sufficiently serious to check their advance southwards. Finlay gave the right answer when he asserted that it was only a single Russian division which was defeated.¹⁴⁸ This is

¹⁴⁰ Leo Diaconus, *op. cit.*, pp. 108–11; Cedrenus, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 384–8.

¹⁴¹ *PVL*, I, p. 50.

¹⁴² See Drinov, *Tuzhnyye slavyane i Vizantiya v X v.*, pp. 101–4; Irechek, *Istoriya bolgar*, p. 242; Uspensky, 'Znachenije pokhodov Svyatoslava', pp. 94–5; Pogodin, *Istoriya Bolgarii*, pp. 44.

¹⁴³ See Schlumberger, *L'Épopée Byzantine*, pp. 55 ff.; Runciman, *op. cit.*, p. 207; Zlatarski, *op. cit.*, I, 2, p. 604; Mutafchiyev, *Istoriya*, I, p. 273; Pastukhov, *Bălgarska istoriya*, I, p. 332; Presnyakov, *Lektsii*, I, p. 86; Derzhavin, *Istoriya*, II, p. 14.

¹⁴⁴ Levchenko (*op. cit.*, pp. 275–6), for example, is one of those who considers it not to have been decisive.

¹⁴⁵ Drinov, *op. cit.*, pp. 102–3; A. Soloviev, 'Autour des Bogomiles' (*Byzantion*, XXII, Brussels, 1952, pp. 89–90).

¹⁴⁶ Schlumberger, *loc. cit.*

¹⁴⁷ Karyshkovsky, 'O khronologii', pp. 130–6; Levchenko, *loc. cit.*

¹⁴⁸ G. Finlay, *History of the Byzantine Empire from DCCXVI to MLVII*, London, 1853, p. 409.

exactly what Leo Diaconus himself wrote: one Russian division, supplemented by Magyars and Bulgarians, was put into the field against Bardas Sclerus.¹⁴⁹ The main body of the Russian army was thus not even engaged; which is why fresh Byzantine troops were ordered into Thrace from Asia immediately after the battle.¹⁵⁰

It is therefore obvious that Svyatoslav's reason for leaving the mountain passes into Bulgaria undefended was not that the Russian losses at Arcadiopolis had left him with insufficient men. The most plausible explanation is that of Chertkov,¹⁵¹ who bases himself on the *Povest'*.¹⁵² He affirms that John Tzimiskes had concluded a treaty of peace with Svyatoslav whom he lulled into a false sense of security by gifts and promises. What forced the emperor to resort to this subterfuge was the rebellion of Bardas Phocas and the continued Russian raids on Thrace, which had strained his resources to the uttermost. His aim was simply to gain time to deal with the rebellion. But Svyatoslav had taken the treaty as proof that although Byzantium was still formidable in defence, it was not now capable of attacking him.

Scylitzes has a story which might seem to cast doubt on Chertkov's interpretation. He says that two Russian spies came into the Byzantine camp just before the invasion of Bulgaria started. They were allowed to see the strength of the army and were sent back to tell Svyatoslav that the emperor was marching against him with a trained and well-disciplined force.¹⁵³ Obviously, if Svyatoslav had sent out spies he must have suspected that a Byzantine attack was imminent and would have been sure of it after receiving the emperor's message. But the story is equally obviously untrue. If Svyatoslav had been warned that Tzimiskes was advancing against him, he would not have been in Dristra when the invasion took place. Similarly, if the emperor had not thought that he would take the Russians by surprise, he would not have risked marching through the dreaded passes in which disaster had overtaken Byzantine invaders of Bulgaria before. He must have known that the Russian army was beyond Preslav and nowhere near the frontier area because he told his men before he crossed the frontier that he would take the Bulgarian capital and defeat the Russians afterwards: he was not expecting to meet them either before or in Preslav.¹⁵⁴ Thus, after crushing the rebellion of Bardas Phocas and secure in the knowledge that Svyatoslav was not expecting an attack, the emperor invaded Bulgaria in 971. The

¹⁴⁹ Leo Diaconus, *op. cit.*, p. 108.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 111.

¹⁵¹ Chertkov, *Opisaniye voyny v.k. Svyatoslava*, p. 48.

¹⁵² *PVL*, I, pp. 50-1.

¹⁵³ Cedrenus, *op. cit.*, II, p. 393.

¹⁵⁴ Leo Diaconus, *op. cit.*, p. 131.

end was not long delayed. In four months the whole of eastern Bulgaria was in Byzantine hands in spite of heroic resistance at Preslav and Dristra. Svyatoslav acknowledged defeat and sailed away up the Dnieper. Here, at the rapids, he met his death at the hands of the Pechenegs in the spring of 972.

IV

Though Svyatoslav failed in his attempt to create an empire of eastern and southern Slavs, his campaigns on the Balkan peninsula brought some advantages to Russia. For the four years from 967 to 971 large numbers of the two peoples had been brought into close contact with each other; and between 969 and 971 they had become partners, even if unequal partners, in a friendly alliance, without linguistic barriers to hinder their free intercourse. It was not only Russian soldiers who entered Bulgaria. Their women-folk came as well; and the bodies of some of them, dressed in men's clothes, were found by the Greeks after one of the battles for Dristra in the summer of 971.¹⁵⁵ The effect which Bulgaria had on the Russians is hard to assess. But some idea of the impression which Preslav would have made on them can be gathered from the *Shestodnev* of the 10th-century Bulgarian writer, John the Exarch, who tried to portray the city as if he were seeing it for the first time through the eyes of a humble peasant visitor from the provinces.¹⁵⁶ Kiev itself was no mean city even at this early period; but before the official conversion of Russia to Christianity, it was no match for the Christian capital of Bulgaria with its monumental architecture, its palaces and churches ornamented with marble, gold and silver, inset coloured glass, glazed ceramic tiles, and all the pomp and splendour which reflected the imperial ambitions and patronage of the arts of its founder, Tsar Simeon.¹⁵⁷ Some of the Russian invaders no doubt knew other great cities of mediaeval Europe such as Constantinople; but in Bulgaria they were in the Slavonic world, in a country which was at once new and familiar. This familiarity of the general back-

¹⁵⁵ Cedrenus *op. cit.*, 11, p. 406. Karyshkovsky ('Russko-bolgarskiye otnosheniya', p. 105) considers that it would be difficult to regard these women as Russians, and he therefore believes that they were Bulgarians. But as Svyatoslav had every intention of settling permanently in Bulgaria, it is to be expected that some of his men would have brought their womenfolk with them. See also Mavrodin, *Drevnyaya Rus'*, p. 207.

¹⁵⁶ John the Exarch, *Shestodnev*, in *Stara bǎlgarska literatura*, ed. B. Angelov and M. Genov, Sofia, 1922, p. 125: 'Yako zhe smr'd', i nishch' chlovek' i stranen', prished' iz'daleche k' pretvoram' knezhyu dvoru, i videv'e divit' se, i pristupiv' k' vratom' chyudit' se v'prashaya, i etr'v'shed', vidit' na obe strane khramy stoyeshche, ukrasheny kamenem' i drevom' isp'sany, i procheye v' dvor'ts' v' shed', i uzrev' polaty vysokoy, i ts'rkvi izdobreny bezgoda kameniyem' i drevom' i sharom', izutri zhe mramorom' i mediyu, srebrom' i zlatom': tache nevedy chesom' prilozhiti ikh', ne bo yest' videl' na svoey zemli togo . . .)

¹⁵⁷ See Vera Ivanova, 'Veliki Preslav' (*Arkheologicheski otkrytiya v Bǎlgariya*, Sofia, 1954, pp. 163-93).

ground and setting must have thrown into sharp relief the advantages of the Bulgarians with their higher cultural attainments, and must have stressed the lesson that Christianity benefits its adherents.

The Balkan campaigns also led to an increase in the number of Bulgarians in Russia. Some would have been brought back by Svyatoslav as prisoners;¹⁵⁸ others, who had identified themselves closely with the Russians during the occupation, may have preferred to live as exiles in Kiev rather than submit to Byzantine domination. Archaeology provides an interesting clue to the identity of some of these Bulgarian refugees or prisoners. V. V. Khvoiko's excavations in 1907 and 1908 established that ornamental glazed wall and floor tiles discovered in the Kievan area were of local manufacture. These tiles closely resemble those of the renowned Preslav school of glazed ceramics, which flourished in the 10th century until the Bulgarian capital fell to John Tzimisce in 971.¹⁵⁹ It seems that the technique was introduced into Russia by Bulgarian craftsmen either during Svyatoslav's campaigns or immediately after them;¹⁶⁰ which would account for the simultaneous decline of the handicraft in its original home. Glass-making and enamelling, which are closely allied to the technique of glazed ceramics, began to be practised in Kiev at about the same time¹⁶¹ and may well have started in the same way. Brickmaking may also have been brought to Russia in this period from Preslav, which had been making bricks since the end of the 9th century.¹⁶² These facts tend to confirm the supposition that large numbers of Bulgarian craftsmen went to Russia as a result of Svyatoslav's campaigns. It was Russia's adoption of Christianity which created the demand for the development of new techniques by Russian craftsmen in the reign of Vladimir I (978–1015). But

¹⁵⁸ If Leo Diaconus (*op. cit.*, p. 155) is to be believed, under the terms of the peace treaty concluded with John Tzimisce, Svyatoslav was obliged to surrender all his prisoners. But the *Povest'* contradicts Leo on this point. According to the latter source (*PVL*, I, p. 52), the people of Pereyaslavets sent word to the Pechenegs that Svyatoslav was returning to Russia with countless prisoners but a small army. The claim in the *Povest'* is certainly an exaggeration. It is meant to fit in with the general picture of the campaigns painted by the chronicler, according to whom the Russians were victorious. On the other hand, Svyatoslav undoubtedly did bring or send prisoners from Bulgaria to Russia at some time during the wars—possibly in the course of the first campaign. For example, he brought back a Greek nun for his son Yaropolk. Cf. *PVL*, I, p. 53: 'U Yaropolka zhe zhena grekini be, i byashe byla chernitseyu; be bo privei' yu otets' yego Svyatoslav, i vda yu za Yaropolka, krasoty radi litsa yeya.' His younger son Vladimir also had a Bulgarian wife (*ibid.*, p. 57), who was no doubt brought to Russia at the same time and in the same way.

¹⁵⁹ Rybakov, *Remeslo Drevney Rusi*, pp. 360–1; A. V. Filippov, *Drevnerusskiye izraztsy*, Vyp. I, Moscow, 1938; K. Miyatev, *Preslavskata keramika*, Sofia, 1936; G. Bakurdjiev, *Bulgarian Ceramics*, Sofia, 1955, pp. 20–22, plates 1–5.

¹⁶⁰ B. A. Shelkovnikov, 'Kievskaya keramika X–XI vv., raspisannaya tsvetnymi emalyami' (*Sovetskaya arkheologiya*, XXIII, Moscow, 1955, pp. 169–82).

¹⁶¹ Rybakov, *op. cit.*, pp. 362–3, 397 ff.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 357. Rybakov also thinks it possible that brickmaking was introduced either from some Byzantine town, such as Kherson, or from Khazaria.

these techniques were naturally not learnt overnight simply because the craftsmen had become Christian; and in the light of the evidence cited above, it is reasonable to look to Bulgaria for their teachers, especially as it can be assumed that Svyatoslav would have wanted to reproduce in Kiev the wonders which he had seen in Preslav.

But more important than any special skills which the Bulgarians may have brought to Russia was their religion. Christianity was by no means unknown in Russia even before Svyatoslav's reign, and Bulgaria had long been one of the most important sources on which Russian Christianity had fed. But the influx of Bulgarian Christians into Russia, and the closer contacts with Bulgaria which were established as a result of Svyatoslav's campaigns, undoubtedly paved the way for the official conversion of Russia some seventeen years later.¹⁶³

¹⁶³ See V. Z. Zavitsevich, 'Velikiy knyaz' kievskiy Svyatoslav Igorevich' (*Trudy Kievskoy Dukhovnoy Akademii*, 3, Kiev, 1888, p. 388); N. Polonskaya, 'K voprosu o khristianstve na Rusi do Vladimira' (*ZhMNP*, 71, St Petersburg, 1917, p. 72); V. Moshin, *Khristianstvo v Rossii do sv. Vladimira* (*Vladimirskiy sbornik*, Belgrade, 1938, pp. 16-18).